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1 INTRODUCTION 
British legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart once published an article entitled 
11 American Jurisprudence through English Eyes."2 Today, it would not be en-
tirely appropriate to publish an article with such a title. Our /I eyes" are no 
longer exclusively, or even predominantly, British, Dutch, or American, but 
a highly idiosyncratic mixture of cultural influence. We are Dutch in the sense 
that we were born and raised in the Netherlands and are subject to Dutch laws, 
but from a cultural point of view our education is a mixture of French, English, 
American, Greek and Roman influences as well as Dutch, although this last 
plays only a minor role. Victorian authors like Dicey and Carlyle appeal much 
more to the writers of this contribution than do Dutch scholars like Huizinga 
or Erasmus. Our appreciation of Anglo-Saxon political culture is much greater 
than our estimation of that of the Netherlands. And finally: the French phiIo-
sophes, Voltaire and Diderot, wrote treatises the significance and aesthetic 
qualities of which far surpass anything that has been written in Dutch. So when 
we are commenting on Dutch and American culture this can hardly be con-
sidered a purely IIDutch contribution." 
Of course, our situation is far from exceptional. Most modem scholars are 
"multicultural/' in that many influences have made themselves felt on their 
mental make-up.3 It is perhaps this predicament that makes it possible for 
us as Dutch scholars to comment on the Dutch constitution with a sense of 
detachment. When we compare the Dutch constitution to the American consti-
tution one element st.t!llds out to wit, the ambivalence of the Dutch constitution. 
The Dutch have a written constitution, but they refrained from adopting 
judicial review as the logical consequence of the idea of higher law.4 The 
1 We want to thank Carla Zoethout for critical remarks on matters of style and content. 
2 Cf. H.LA. Hart uAmericanJurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream," Georgia UlW Review 11.5 (1977), reprinted in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 123-145. 
3 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative/' University 
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25 (1992): 751-793. 
4 Cf. article 120 of the Dutch Constitution: nThe constitutionality of acts of parliament and 
treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts./I For a commentary: P.B. Cliteur, "Tradition-
alism, Democracy, and Judicial Review," in B. van Roermund1 ed., Constitutional Review, 
Verfassungsgerichtbarkeit, Constitutionele toetsing (Deventerl Zwolle: Kluwer/Tjeenk Willink, 
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Dutch have a democracy" but they still have a queen and are therefore a mon-
archy. So a democracy in conjunction with a monarchy - a combination that 
sounds peculiar if not downright contradictory to those thinking and acting 
under the influence of Thomas Paine's devastating criticism of monarchy in 
his Rights of Man. 5 
Despite their preference for a monarchy (and this has not diminished under 
the present queen) the Dutch consider their state a pure democracy. They'have 
two reasons for doing so. First, the queen has no real political influence: she 
is a symbol of the state. Second, the Dutch thlnk that, since the 1960s Dutch 
society has changed considerably from a rather traditiona1.,. conservative, re-
ligiously oriented society to one of the most secular6 and progressive countries 
in the world. And progressive, they think, also means democratic. 
The way Dutch society has changed from a traditional to a more progres-
sive-liberal one has been analyzed by James Kennedy in his excellent book 
Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw.7 No doubt, many of the contributions in Regulating 
Morality (implicitly or explicitly) praise the Dutch model. In the field of abor-
tion and euthanasia it seems to be a beacon for other parts of the world.s But 
does this equally apply to Dutch democracy? Were the sixties a constructive 
period for the Dutch conception of democracy? Were the sixties a period of 
efflorescence for Dutch democracy or a period of decline? In this contribution 
we assert that although the sixties may have been beneficial in a certain re-
1993), 55-77;Jan ten Kate and Peter J. Koppen, liThe Netherlands: Toward a Form of Judicial 
Review," in C. Neal Tate and Torbjom Vallender, eds., The Global Expansion of Judicial Power 
(New York: New York University Press, 1995), 369-381. 
5 Thomas Pame, Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burkes l Attack on the French Revolution 
(1791), in Thomas Paine, Collected Writings (New York: The Library of America, 1995),433-
66l. 
6 The Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, an organization for advice and research in social and 
political affairsl found in 1994 that to the question liDo you believe in God?H fifty percent 
of the Dutch people answered lino." Cf. J.W. Becker and R. Vink, Secularisatie in Nederland, 
1966-1991 (Rijswijk: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureaut 1994). Cf. also Gerard Dekker, Joep 
de Hart, andJan Peters, God in Nederland, 1966-1996 (AnthOS/RKK/KRO, 1997) that confirms 
the earlier research. 
7 James C. Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw. Nederland in de jaren zestig (Amsterdam/ 
Meppel: Boom, 1995). 
8 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pressl 1995), 178: uThere 
is only one country in which doctors can openly help their patients to die in a peaceful 
and dignified way. In the Netherlands, a series of court cases during the 1980s upheld a 
doctor's right to assist a patient to die, even if that assistance amounted to giving the patient 
a lethal injection. Doctors in the Netherlands who comply with certain guidelines ... can 
now quite openly carry out euthanasia and can report this on the death certificate without 
fear of prosecution." 
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spect/ the influence of the ideology of the sixties on democracy has been an 
unmitigated disaster. 
As Fukuyama explains in his recent book on the sixties,lO its advocates 
label the period as anti-authoritarian. Advocates of the sixties criticized the 
fifties for the supposed hierarchic and authoritarian period of that decade. 
Although this may sound paradoxical, it is precisely this anti-authoritarian 
character that is responsible for the undemocratic strain in current Dutch 
political thinking. 
Let us analyze this paradox paradox paradox by showing how the Dutch 
managed to reconcile monarchy with democracy. Subsequently, we shall see 
that we have to continue with the process of democratization of society, which 
means that we have to go back to the foundations of our constitutional system. 
2 MONARCHY AND DEMOCRACY 
In their literal sense, monarchy and democracy are irreconcilable.ll A monar-
chy is (1) government by a monarch or (2) a state ruled or headed by a 
monarch. A monarch is a person who reigns over a state or territory, usually 
for life and by hereditary right, especially as an absolute ruler. 
As Paine made abundantly clear, this system of government is inherently 
irreconcilable with democracy. Monarchy government by one person. Demo-
cracy is rule by many. Monarchy means government by a hereditary person. 
Democracy is government by or by their elected representatives. 
How is it possible that in the Netherlands (and in Great Britain, but we 
will concentrate on the Dutch case)12 a system of government has evolved 
with the pretension of being a monarchy and a democracy at the same time? 
The answer is this: because in their constitutions the Dutch and British realized 
that which from a rationalist perspective (Paine's for instance)13 is utterly 
absurd. The ancient phrase H the king can do no wrong" was interpreted in 
a completely new way. It used to be interpreted as ""the king is so wise, in-
9 Ct. for a positive assessment: Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, 
France, Italy, and the United States, c. 1958-c. 1974 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
and for the Netherlands: Hans Righart, De eindeloze jaren zestig. Geschiedenis van een 
generatieconJ1ict (Amsterdam/ Antwerpen: De Arbeiderspers, 1995). 
10 Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order 
(London: Profile Books, 1999). 
11 Cf. for an excellent appraisal of the different views: S. W. Couwenber&- "Monarchie en 
democratie," Tijdschrijt voor Bestuurswetenschappen & Publiekrecht 3 (March 1999): 180-186 
and S.W. Couwenberg, .IlEinde van de monarchle?" Liberaal Reveil 5 (1998): 182-190. The 
republican view is expressed in Tom Rooduijn, ed., De Republiek der Nederlanden, Pleidooien 
voor het afschaffen van de monarchie (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1998). 
12 An excellent book on the British scene is Vernon Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press" 1997). 
13 But also our latter-day anti-monarchists assembled in Rooduijn, De Republiek der Nederlanden. 
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spired by divine wisdom, that it would be a great injustice to contradict him." 
As the apostles were divinely inspired in their mission, so the kings ruled by 
divine right and were infallible for that very reason (like the pope). 
But in its modem interpretation this maxim means: the king must be placed 
in a position where criticism can no longer affect him. That is, he must be 
absolved from political influence. In a sense Paine led the way to such an inter-
pretation of the ancient maxim. He criticizes the maxim "'the king can no 
wrong" as follows. "When it is laid down as a maxim, that a King can do no 
wrong, it places him in a state of similar security with that of idiots and persons 
P insane, and responsibility is out of the question with respect to himself. It then 
descends upon the Minister .... "14 
What Paine rejects as absurd is exactly what happened in the Netherlands 
and other parts of the world where monarchy survived under new and demo-
cratic conditions. Although the king is not considered to be Jlinsane/' he (or 
in the Dutch case: she) is not responsible for government policy. The one who 
is responsible is the minister. Paine puts this well: IiWhen there is a Part in 
a Government which can do no wrong, it implies that it does nothing; and 
is only the machine of another power, by whose advice and direction it acts. 
What is supposed to be the King in mixed Governments, is the Cabinet."lS 
The king is a Roi faineant as royalists in the last century mockingly remarked. 
Dutch constitutional history is primarily a history of the quarrels between 
king and ministers. Those quarrels proved necessary in order to make the king 
understand that lIthe king can do no wrong" implies that he does nothing and 
that he is only the machine of another power, namely that of the minister.16 Some 
of our kings had great difficulties with this lesson. William rr was rather docile, 
but William III and Queen Wilhelmina fell back on the older interpretation 
of IJthe king can do no wrong.//17 That is, he can exert all political power and 
never be criticized because of his high position or his relationship with God 
as the source of justice. But kings and queens who understood th~ signs of 
the time, modem royalty in the sense of monarchical government which is 
in accordance with democratic ideas and values, accepted that, as Paine said 
appropriately, "responsibility is out of the question with respect to himself/' 
Article 42 of the Dutch constitution settles this situation in cryptic words: 
"(1) The Government shall comprise the King and the Ministers. (2) The King 
14 Cf. Paine, Collected Writings, 534. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Cf. H.A. van Wijnen, Van de macht des konings. My the en werkelijkheid van de constitutionele 
monarchie (Amsterdam: Contact, 1975),48 and A.M. Donner" JJErfelijk en onschendbaar/' 
in C.A. Tamse, ed., De monarchie in Nederland (Amsterdam/Brussel: Elsevier, 1980), 135-154. 
17 Cf. on William ID, Joris Abeling, Teloorgang en wederopstanding van de Nederlandse monarchie 
(1848-1898) (Amsterdam: Prometheus; 1996); Paul van 't Veer, "De merkwaardigheden van 
A.W.P. Weitzel," inA.W.P. Weitzel,Maar Majesteit! Koning Willem III en zijn tijd. De geheime 
dagboeken van minister A. W.P. Weitul. Bewerkt en ingeleid door Paul van ~t Veer (Amsterdam: 
De Arbeiderspers, 1968), 7-23. 
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is immune; the Ministers are responsible." Hence formally the king is still part 
of the government, but in reality his political influence is reduced by the sub-
sequent paragraph: the ministers are responsible. 18 
In theory., the phrase lithe ministers are responsible" could mean "they 
are responsible for other people whose actions they are not authorised to forbid 
or controL" The concept of responsibility in Greek tragedy and in the penal 
systems of primitive people is one without the power to avoid or avert. But 
in enlightened thinking we consider it unjust to punish people or even re-
proach people for things over which they have no control. So the legal and 
moral counterpart of ministerial responsibility is ministerial power. This is the 
legal power to control: (1) the kingl and (2) the bureaucracy. 
As far as the king is concerned, this was kept implicit in our constitution, 
in deference to the king. But it is implied in our constitution, of course, and 
the king is well aware of this. He can only act with the consent of the minister. 
Not only is his behavior subject to ministerial approval, but his speech as well. 
"Freedom of speech" for a king in constitutional monarchy would therefore 
be nonsensicaL 19 
That summarizes the role of the king. But what can we say about bureau-
cracy? As far as the bureaucracy is concerned, there was no need to be so 
cautious and evasive of the real dilemmas. Article 44 of the Dutch constitution 
states of departments: that IIthey shall be headed by a Minister." So a minister 
is lIthe head" of the bureaucracy. In every real democracy two maxims are 
essential: One is responsible for one's power; but a150 one can only be respon-
sible if one has power?O 
The first maxim is well known and beyond dispute; the second maxim 
is often forgotten. It cannot be married with our assumption that power is 
bad or dangerous. Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.21 
This is music to our ears. But power is a fact of life. The only thing we can 
and, indeed, should do is to counter a certain power with another power. With-
out the power to control power, we have no democracy. So power is essential. 
18 Cf. for the history of this article: J. Heemskerk, De Praktijk onzer grondwet, 2 vols. (Utrecht: 
J.L. Beijers, 1881), 1:46. 
19 In 1853 the king delivered a speech against the will of the cabinet Subsequently, the cabinet 
resigned. Cf. Abeling, Teloorgang en wederopstanding, 30. 
20 Cf. P.B. Cliteurl "Indien veranrwoordelijk dan bevoegd?Fl in M.C. Burkens, M. Jurgens, A.K. 
Koekkoekl and J-J. Vis, eds., Gelet op de Grondwet (Deventer: Kluwer/ 1998), 124-137. 
21 "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost 
always bad man/' according to English historian Lord Acton (1834-1902). Cf. his letter of 
3 April 1887, to Bishop Mandell Creighton (in The Life and Letters of Man dell Creightonl 1904) 
and John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton (Lord Acton)1 in J. Rufus Fears, ed., Essays in 
Religion, Poltics, and Morality: Selected Writings of Lord Acton, 3 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Classics, 1988),3:519. 
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The only question is: How to limit power and how to make those in power 
democraticallyaccountable?22 
Thls brings us to parliament. Ministerial responsibility is, of course, a 
responsibility to parliament. Parliament can send both individual ministers and 
an entire cabinet home. This rule evolved in the years of 1866 and 1868 when 
parliament clashed with the king and his ministers.23 When we add to this 
state of affairs the fact that every citizen had the right to vote in 1919, it is 
tempting to consider the Netherlands a democracy since the beginning of this 
century. 
3 DEMOCRACY: APPEARANCE OR REALITY? 
Is the Netherlands really a democracy? In order to answer this question, we 
have to consider in more detail what is the essence of democracy. This may sound 
ambitious and a bit philosophical, but it could be easier than it seems. Let us 
first exclude the possibility of direct democracy as it was practized in ancient 
Athens with its small population.24 In modem, large-scale societies this is 
no longer practicable and it is unrealistic to have illusions about it.2s We have 
to limit ourselves to an indirect more specifically parliamentary -- democracy. 
A well-functioning indirect democracy can be defined as the political system 
where the people have great and, in ideal circumstances.! even absolute in-
fluence over governmental policy. The people not only appoint their own 
leaders, but those leaders resign once they have fallen from grace. And because 
direct democracy is impossible in a modern, large-scale society, # democratic" 
in an indirect democracy means that the representatives of the people have 
maximum influence on government policy. They decide, on our behalf, when 
our political leaders have to go. 
22 Cf. the great American politician Madison in The Federalist 51 (1787): ;'If men were angels, 
no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
internal contr6rs on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is 
to be administered by men over menr the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next placer oblige it to control itself." 
James Madison, Writings (New York: The Library of America, 1999),295. 
23 Cf. W.]. Baron van Welderen Rengers, I'Ministerie van Zuijlen-Heemskerk," in Schets eener 
parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland van 1849 tot 1901. Vierde bijgewerkte uitgave met 
aanteekeningen vanC.W. de Vries,5vols. (,s-Gravenhage: MartinusNijhoff, 1948)1 1:361-412; 
P.J. Gud, IiKroon of vertegenwoordiging?" in Honderd jaren. Een eeuw van stlllltkundige 
vormgeving in Nederland 1840-1940 (Assen: Van Gorcumr 1979),73-86. 
24 George Kloskor The Development of Plato's Political Theory (New York: Methuen, 1986),6: 
"The small size of the typical polis fostered intense political involvement in its citizens." 
25 Benjarnin Constant knew this well. Cf. Benjamin Constant, De la Liberte des Anciens comparee 
a celle des Modernes. Discours prononce Cl l'Atheneeroyal de Paris en 1819 in Benjamin Constant .. 
fcrits politiques. Textes choisis presentees et annotes par Milrcel Gauchet (Paris: Gallimar: 1997), 
591-619. 
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In our political system there are two sorts of representatives of the people: 
Those who do the actual job of governing the state: ministers, and those con-
cerned with exercising the right to control those who rule: members of par-
liament. 
In an ideal democracy, parliamentarians have maximum influence over 
the ministers, and the ministers control every aspect of government policy. 
In a democracy all political power that cannot be reduced to the power of par-
liamentarians and ministers is illegitimate. 
In the last century, the great threat to democracy was royalty?6 The king 
exercized power that was neither controlled by parliament, or by ministers. 
The ministers were servants of the king and not of parliament (and therefore 
of "us/' "the people,,).27 
This was a peculiar opinion, even in 1820. But after 1848, when the prin-
ciple of ministerial responsibility (and consequently ministerial power) was 
established it became an anachronism. 
4 ANTI-AUTHORITARIANISM IN GENERAL 
From the second half of the nineteenth century to the second half of the 
twentieth century, the Netherlands was on the secure path of becoming a 
democracy. Less and less power was put in the hands of the king, and more 
and more power became vested in the hands of democratically chosen or legit-
imized persons or institutions. But, contrary to most accounts of that period, 
this all changed in the 1960s. 
One of the central features of the development of democracy since the 
sixties is that the king has been replaced by a new illegitimate power: 
bureaucracy. Nowadays, bureaucracy almost reigns supremely. 
Many scholars have emphasized this, of course. Some authors use the 
words "the fourth branch,,28 - a rather silly expression, to be sure, because 
it suggests that the three branches of Montesquieu were comparable to this 
new fourth branch. And that is not so. Montesquieu dealt with legitimate 
26 Cf. John Alder, "Ministerial Responsibility and Civil Servants," in Constitutional & Ad-
ministrative Law (1989ireprint, HOllitdmills and London: MacMillau, 1994),223-233. Alder 
makes clear that ministererial responsibilty developed as the royal power eroded. 
27 Around 1820, when the king had a conflict with parliament, he said to his secretary Sirtema 
van Grovestin: "'Why do they (members of parliament; pc) accuse me ministers? V/hat are 
ministers? Absolutely nothing ... I can rule without ministers, or, when it suits me, I can 
put whoever I want at the head of a ministry, even one of my coachmen; because t I am 
the man who acts and who is responsible for the acts of government." Cited by: N. Cramer, 
fiDe kroon op het werk van 1813," in Tamse, Monarchie in Nederland, 11-60, especially 21. 
Cramer comments: "Those outbursts could not stop the constitutional development." 
28 In the Netherlands: R Crince le Roy, De vierde macht. Een hernieuwde kennismaking (Den 
Haag: VUGA Boekerij, 1976), a somewhat confusing contribution to constitutional theory 
because the author is uncertain how to evaluate the rise to power of bureaucracy. 
42 Paul Cliteur & Rene van Wissen 
government actions or formal power.29 That is power attributed by the law. 
Scholars who talk about a "fourth branch," however, deal with illegitimate 
power" power that has been taken, not attributed. The most astonishing (and 
frightening aspect) of the reign of bureaucracy is that most scholars do not 
recognize bureaucratic power as illegitimate and as unconstitutional power. They 
consider it as a fact of life, something you have to accept as a necessity in the 
modem world. Many scholars)' especially political scientists and those reflecting 
on public administration, even defend bureaucracy against democratically 
chosen and legitimized rulers. This is a paradoxical state of affairs, of course. 
How did this come about? We believe this was a result of the 19605. 
5 THE TRAUMA OF POS1W AR SOCIETY 
Postwar society suffers from a trauma: the trauma of Nazism. In the history 
of the western world the period between 1933 to 1945 has been stigmatised 
by the rise to power of an appalling regime: that of Adolf Hitler. How was 
it possible that in western democratic states such abhorrent ideas as those of 
Nazism could flourish. How is it possible that in Gennany, the country of Kant 
and Goethe, such primitive and barbarian ideas prevailed? Every commentator 
has his own theory. Psychoanalysis, Marxism - they all tried to explain the 
genesis of Nazism. Individual thinkers such as Hannah Arendt" Jean Paul 
Sartre, Karl Popper and many others tried to come to grips with fJthe origins 
of totalitarianism." Also, the ideologues of the sixties struggled with this 
question. They reached the following conclusion. Nazism has to do with obedience. 
Nazism is to say "'Jawohl!/I and do what has been ordered, whatever that may 
be. The famous experiments of Stanley Milgram30 showed us that people ex-
ecute orders, as long as they are given by somebody who seemed to have legit-
imate authority. 
Adolf Eichmann, responsible for the deaths of countless Jews in the con-
centration camps" became the symbol of the mentality of "'Befehl ist Befehl" 
and "1ch habe gehorcht."31 The ideologues of the sixties drew a very simple 
conclusion from this state of affairs: hierarchy, commands, bosses, authority 
- all the things that seemed characteristic of Nazism - had to be rejected. Dutch 
writer Harry Mulisch explains his own anti-German attitude and that of the 
younger generation.32 He loathed "fathers, teachers, policemen and those kind 
of people, who always know better, take things away, forbid things)' do not 
29 Cf. Montesquieu, Oeuvres completes, 2 vols. Texte presente et annore par Roger Caillois (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1951),2: 396-407 (De ['Esprit des lois, Chapitre VI, De la Constitution d'Angleterre). 
30 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). 
31 Cf. Harry Mulisch, De zaak 40/61. Een reportage (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij De Bezige Bij),124. 
32 Cf. his lively portrait of the Dutch youngsters of 1966 in Harry Mulisch, Bericht aan de 
rattenkoning (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1966). 
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listen, but ultimately are stupid, servile and professionally arrogant, and what 
is worse: unjust. "33 Although he is older than members of the protest-gener-
ation of the sixties were, Mulisch was one of their foremost spokesmen. fill 
est L.Tlterdit d'interdire," was written on the walls in Paris during the revolution 
of May 1968.34 This was a gross exaggeration, as some more rational scholars 
knew well.35 Every state has to forbid certain kinds of behavior: racism, 
homicide, theft, fraud - "11 est necessaire d'interdire" such harmful behavior, 
one is tempted to retort. A peaceful society cannot exist without prohibitions. 
HOrder is heaven's first law." 
But this rejection of all prohibition was not only a symbol: it was dangerous 
nonsense. Because of this mentality criminologists were hesitant to state the 
true figures of rising crime.36 It became a taboo to propose adequate measures 
of crime control. Now we are confronted with the mess of the sixties in this 
respect. The prophets of those times are silent, and a few even show remorse 
(although not many). But the devastating influence of the sixties in this respect 
is a hard 'fact. 
What concerns us here, however, is the effect of the self-indulgent and 
anarchistic ideology of the sixties on democracy. This effect was disastrous. 
Let us see why. 
6 THE HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-AUTHORITARIANISM FOR DEMO-
CRACY 
In The Federalist 51 J ames Madison states uYou must first enable the govern-
ment to control the governed." According to the ideologues of the sixties, there 
was no need to govern, because men were considered to be angels. Every form 
of power had to be eradicated, because they believed that when nobody had 
power, everything would run itself.37 The central idea behind all this, is Rous-
seau's conception of human nature. Naive maybe, but influential nonetheless. 
33 Harry Mulisch, De toekomst van gisteren (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1972),37. All translations 
are by the authors of this article/ unless stated otherwise. 
34 Regis Debray, La Republique expliquee it ma fllle (Paris: Seuil/ 1998). 
35 "The most striking thing about it was the verbal delirium/' Raymond Aron wrote in May 
1968. Cf. Raymond Aron, Ltl revolution introuvable (paris: Fayard, 1968) and H. Shiart Hughes, 
Rebels: The Political Culture of European Dissent 1968-1987 (1988; reprint, Cambridge, MA 
and London: Harvard University Press, 1990), 6. Cf. for a later assessment of 1968: Luc 
Ferry and Alain Renaut, 68-86, Itineraires de rindividu (paris: Gallimard, 1987). 
36 As they were hesitant to confess that rising crime is a phenomenon since the sixties. Cf. 
on the fifties: Jolm Up dike, HThe Fifties/' in More Matter: Essays and Criticism (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1999),25-29, especially 25: "You could walk most city streets without 
a qualm at two in the morning, and as to family values - boy, did we have family values!" 
37 This explains the popularity of self-regulation by the Dutch. Q. on this topic the contribution 
of Griffiths in this volume. 
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In the more realistic conception of politics.' which we encounter in.' for 
instance.' The Federalist Papers; power is considered a fact of life. The question 
is not Jlhow to annul poweru or //how to make every sort of authority impos-
siblelf but Nhow to control power.1f How to get power into the hands of the 
right persons and that - in a democracy - is the people. Lord Acton states 
the same in a much less known and undoubtedly less popular quotation: 1/ Ar-
gument for absolute power: You must put confidence somewhere. You can't 
escape the conditions of human nature. Put it where responsibility is con-
centrated."38 
Because all centralized power was considered wrong by the ideologues 
of the sixties, power by cabinet or individual ministers was considered to be 
an anathema. This bias against all central power fostered a kind of illegitimate 
and informal power, comparable to the royal power that had been driven out 
so successfully in the last century. Bureaucracy took over the place abandoned 
by the king. Unfortunately, it is very difficult for the democratically-legitimized 
branches of government to control bureaucracy. Not because Hreality is so com-
plex" (as we nowadays hear ad nauseam).' but because of our own ideas. Many 
people consider it a gross violation of the rights of civil servants that they have 
to serve. This picture appears quite clearly from several debates in the Nether-
lands on the relation between politics and bureaucracy since the sixties. Let 
us review three events representing the fundamental change in the position 
of civil servants. 
7 FREEDOM OF SPEECH FOR CIVIL SERVANTS 
A case concerning the supposed right to free speech for civil servants arose 
in the Netherlands in 1998. One of the top civil servants, Secretary-general 
Van Wijnbergen of Economic Affairs.' criticized government policy in the news-
papers.39 To the question whether a civil servant is allowed to criticise his 
minister; this civil servant gave the following answer: "1 am not the messenger 
of the minister.//40 According to another civil servant, a scholar; working in 
the department of Justice, a civil servant may I.Isay whatever he wishes.1f41 
38 Cf. Dalberg-Acton, Essays in ReligionJ Polties, and Morality, 519. 
39 Jannetje Koelewijn, "Sweder van Wijnbergen een excellent lastpak. Secretaris-generaalop 
EZ hecht aan recht op kritiek/ NRC Handelsblad, 9 November 1998; uEconomische groei kan 
tegenvallen," NRC Handelsblad, 7 September 1998. Cf. also: R. van Wissen, "Tegenstanders 
van ambtelijke uitingsvrijheid moeten met de ambtenaren bekritiseren, maar de wet. 
Interview met S. van Wijnbergen," Liberaal Reveil 40 (October 1999): 194-197. 
40 In NRC Handelsblad, 9 November 1998. 
41 J.J. Stam, il Ambtenaar mag zeggen wat hij wil/," NRC HandelsbladJ 21 October 1998. Many 
other scholars took the same stance: Baueo van der Wal, II'De bizarre woede van een 
wetenschapper/' Management & Bestuur (april 1999): 23; Paul Bordewijk, HOpenbare 
uitspraken ambtenaren geen gevaar voor de democratie," Binnenlands Bestuur (30 oktober 
1998): 6018; E. van Thijn, "De ambtenaar en de politiek II," RM Themis 5 (1999): 165-167; 
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From a sound democratic perspective, these may seem ridiculous and 
probably eccentric ideas, but the Dutch government and the Dutch legislator 
are partly responsible for the dissemination of these ideas. When the Dutch 
constitution was revised in 1983 constitutional or civil rights became very 
popular. So far, so good, but many people had a feeling that a positive attitude 
towards civil rights (or human rights, there is no need to distinguish between 
these in the context of our problem) would mean to extend them to officials 
as well as to citizens. So civil servants, too, were entitled to freedom of speech. 
It is crystal-clear that in a parliamentary democracy civil servants cannot 
have a right to free speech with any meaningful content. By that last qualifica-
tion we mean that having a right to free speech should at least give one the 
right to say controversial things - things that are not pleasing to the ear of 
the more powerful - , in particular those higher in the ranks of government. 
To say that you have a right to free speech and at the same time proclaim that 
you are not allowed to ventilate controversial ideas or ideas that contradict your 
superior, is no free speech. 
Now, does a civil servant have the right to say controversial things, to 
contradict his superior (i.e. the minister)? This is the central question we have 
to address. To answer it affirrnativelywould make the position of the minister 
an impossible one: he is held responsible for expressions that he has no legal 
right to proscribe. Therefore, the choice is clear: Either we abandon ministerial 
responsibility for the acts and speech of bureaucracy or we deny civil servants 
the freedom of speech. 
The first option would set back the clock to a time before 1866/1868. 
Ministers would only be required to provide information on the opinions of 
bureaucrats, as in former times they could provide information on ideas of 
the Icing. But they would be unable (because legally forbidden) to hold bureau-
cracy in restraint, as in former times they were unable to control the king. In 
short: democracy would become a charade. We believe, one should choose 
the second alternative: deny freedom of speech to civil servants. Free speech 
is a great thing. Nobody will deny this.42 But the very reasons why freedom 
of speech for citizens is important are those that lead us to deny it to civil 
J. de Vries, UAmbtenaar zit klem tussen regels &l resultaat," EZ-journa£lZ35 (14 November 
1998): 8. A minority of scholars spoke out in favor of the classical doctrine that civil servants 
have no freedom of speech.: C.A.J.M. Kortmann, "De ambtenaar en de politiek I," RM Themis 
5 (1999): 163-165 and Frits Bolkestein, U Ambtenaar is boodschapper van de minister," De 
Volkskrant, 6 March 1999i P.B. Cliteur, "Het einde van de democratie?" in Marcel Bamard 
and Abe van der Werff, eds' f Dit is het einde niet: Profetie met het DOg op het jaar 2000. 
Onderbreking vol. 2 (Kampen: Uitgeverij Kok, 1998),23-41; P.B. Cliteur, uDe euthanasie 
van democratie,lf in S.W. Couwenberg, De strijd gaat voortf Liberalisme als heersende ideologie 
en bron van nieuwe strijd (Baarn: Agora, 1999),40-57. 
42 Cf. on the history of free speech the classic study by Bury, A History of the Freedom of Thought 
(1913; reprint, London: Thornton Butterworth, 1932) and the defense ofJ.S. Mill., On Uberty 
(1859; reprint, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977). 
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servants and to the kIDg. Freedom of speech is irreconcilable with the foun-
dations of parliamentary democracy. 
In 1986, however, the Dutch legislators made a rather ambivalent law, pro-
claiming what might be interpreted as a certain kind of free speech for civil 
servants.43 The question was discussed in parliament. There appeared to be 
an overwhehning majority :in favor of free speech for civil servants.44 Only 
some marginal conservative parties, such as the SGP (an orthodox protestant 
party), proved capable of posing the correct constitutional questions. The gov-
ernment had presented the bill as a .IIbalance" between the interests of the 
government and those of the civil servants. But the crucial question is (accord-
ing to the SGP): Should we try "to keep the balance" in the relation between 
government and civil servant? Is it not more in accordance with sound democratic 
principles to say that the interests of the government hilve priority over those 
of the civil servants?45 A good question, indeed, but not in harmony with the 
dominant climate of opinion of that time. 
The same party made another critical remark: HCivil rights protect inter-
ference by the government in a free domain of the citizen. Whoever enters 
the civil service cannot on that same basis claim a free domain against his 
employer.1J'46 
The majority of the parliamentarians" however, did not address those 
questions. The Hpeople drunk" was at the helm of state, not the Npeople sober/' 
8 QUANGOS 
Another undemocratic strain in Dutch political culture since the sixties has 
been the proliferation of quangos: organizations that are financed by the gov-
ernment but act independently of it.47 From the perspective of a properly 
functioning democracy this sounds problematic, if not downright undesirable. 
Why should llWe The People" pay for organizations that we do not control? 
In 1974, one of the first commentators (and advocates) of quangos in the 
Netherlands gave the following answer. The main argument in favor of quan-
gos appeared to be a kind of autonomous development that was considered 
43 Cf. Ambtenarenwet (Act of 20 April 1988, Stb. 229, Lw.tr. 2 November 1988), art. 125a. 
44 Cf. Wijziging van de Ambtenarenwet 1929 ter zake van de uitoefening van grondrechten, 
Voorlopig verslag, vastgesteld op 5 December 1986, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1986-1987, 
19 495, M. 4, 1-9. 
45 Posed by the .SGP. Cf. BijI. Hand. IT 1986-1987, 19495, nr. 4,3. 
46 Posed by the SGP. Cf. BijL Hand. II 1986-1987, 19 495, nr. 4, 4. Similar considerations can 
be found in the work of the great Dutch constitutional scholar Buys. Cf. J.T. Buijs, JJ Art. 
8," in De grondwet. Toelichting en kritiek (Arnhem: P. Gouda Quint, 1883), 1:56-62. 
47 Short for quasi (or quasi-autonomous) non-govemment( al) organization. Cf. Concise Oxford 
Dictionary: quango: a semi-public body with financial support from and senior appointments 
made by the government. 
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beneficial and inevitable at the same time. This sounds mysterious, but not 
for those who are initiated in Dutch political culture. The American historian 
(of Dutch descent) J ames Kermedy appropriately stressed the dominance of 
a kind of secular faith of the elites in the sixties. They all shared an implicit 
belief in progress: nThe widespread belief in the inevitable realization of 
"modem life' is one of the most fascinating aspects of the intellectual world 
of the elites of the sixties.,,48 The main argument for the introduction of quan-
gos was, indeed, that the ideal of ministerial responsibility uhad not been 
adapted to the changing social circumstances."49 These social circumstances 
were supposed to have changed in the sense that a minister cannot control 
everything. And if the minister cannot control everything, why proclaim that 
he should control everything? This is the crux of the argument in favour of 
quangos; how naive this may sound when simplified as bluntly as this. 
Two arguments were added to this i1implicit historicism" in favor of 
quangos: First, that a concentration of power in the hands of the government 
should be avoided;50 and Second that the independence from the government 
of certain organizations can be justified on the basis of democratization.sl 
Both arguments need to be analyzed. The crucial question is: I1Should 
concentration in the hands of government be avoided at all?H In Rousseau's 
conception of politics and reality that prevailed in the sixties this question 
should be answered affirmatively. JlPower tends to corrupt and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely," the adherents of the ideology of the sixties say as did 
Lord Acton. But they forget another maxim of the Great British historian: 
11 Argument for absolute power: You must put confidence somewhere. You 
can't escape the conditions of human nature. Put it where responsibility is 
concentrated."S2 What the ideologues of the sixties did not understand, is 
that power is always located somewhere. If you make it impossible for demo-
cratic government to govern, the power will shift to bureaucracy, monarchy, 
hlltermediary structures, etcetera. However, the blind spot of the ideologues 
of the sixties was that they were only concerned with making the government 
unable to govern (thinking thereby they had made a great contribution to the 
constitutionalist ideal). 
48 . KefuLedYf Nieuw Babylon, 15. 
49 M. Scheltema, Zelfstandige bestuursorganen. Rede uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt 
van gewoon hoogleraar in het administratief recht aan de Rijksuniversiteit te Groningen op 21 mei 
1974 (Groningen" H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1974)" 5. 
50 Cf. Scheltema; Zelfstandige bestuursorganen, 10: .IIEen belangrijk punt kan zijn het streven 
om een te grate machtsconcentratie te voorkomen. De regering beschikt op veel terreinen 
over grote bevoegdheden. Men kan er in het algemeen bezwaar tegen hebben dat op een 
plaats veel bevoegdhedoi samenkomen." 
51 Ibid., 11: uEen tweede argument om tot een zekere onafhankelijkheid van de regering te 
komen kan de wens zijn om gehoor te geven aan de behoefte tot inspraak en democrati-
sering." 
52 Fears, ed., Essays in Religion, 519. 
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This also explains the enonnous popularity of Montesquieu and the theory 
of the separation of powers and checks and balances. Of course, separation 
of powers is an important element of the concept of constitutionalism or - in 
the European context - the Rechtsstaat.53But only in the interpretation of a 
separation of legitimate powers, J;lamely: legislative, judiciary and executive. In 
the perverted interpretation of the separation of powers it became the battle 
cry for those intellectuals who wanted to realize countervailing powers every-
where. Seen from that perspective, concentration of power in the hands of 
government is wrong, and bureaucracy is presented as a countervailing power 
against government, as we see in the arguments in favor of the introduction 
of quangos. 
9 1HE DEPENDENCE OR INDEPENDENCE OF THE CROWN PROSECUTION OFFICE 
A third development that took place during the sixties with devastating 
consequences for the democratic character of the Dutch state, is the move of 
the Public Prosecution Service away from the political branches to a sort of 
semi-autonomous state. 54 
The Dutch constitution - like every other constitution of liberal demo-
cracies - guarantees the independence of the judiciary. 55 Article 117 of the 
constitution states that Hmembers of the judiciary responsible for the ad-
ministration of justice ... shall be appointed for life by royal decree." Their 
legal status, as the Article continues, Nshall in other respects be regulated by 
act of parliament/' Appointment for life and the other provisions mentioned 
were introduced to guarantee the independence of the judiciary from the 
executive power of the state. 
But what is the position of the public prosecutor? Is he part of the executive 
or part of the judicial branch? In the article of the Dutch constitution mentioned 
above, the public prosecutor is explicitly excluded from the judicial branch. 
In the Dutch text, this is appears more clearly than in translation: "Leden van 
53 Cf. on the concepts of constitutionalism and Rechtsstaat: P.W.C. Akkermans, DJ. Elzinga, 
E. Pietermaat-Kros, Constitutionalism in the Netherlands: The Dutch Contributions to the Fourth 
World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law in Tokyo (Groningen, 
University Press, 1995); D.J. Elzinga, F. Goudappel, and H.R.B.M Kummeling, eds., Constitu-
tionalism, Universalism and Democracy, The Dutch Contribution to the Fifth World Congress of 
the International Association ofConstitutionallJ1.w in Rotterdam, July 1999 (Groningen, University 
Press, 1999); C.M. Zoethout, Constitutionalisme. Een vergelijkend onderzoek naar het beperken 
van overheidsmacht door het recht (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1995): 218-223. 
54 Cf. for a comparative study of the situation in England, Scotland, the Netherlands and 
Germany: Julia Fionda, Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A Comparative Study (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press" 1995). 
55 P.5. Atiyah, Law & Modern Society (1983; reprint, Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 13; ].P. Loaf, ed., Onajhankelijkheid en onpartijdigheid. De randvoorwaarden voor 
het bestuur en beheer van de rechterlijke macht (Leiden: Stichting NJCM-Boekerij 36, 1999). 
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de rechterlijke macht met rechtspraak belast// which means: "Members of the 
judicial branch who are concerned with the administration of justice as judges 
do .... n 
Not only the Dutch constitution, but other legal provisions as well were 
clear about the position of the Dutch Public Prosecution Service. The "Wet 
op de Rechterlijke OrganisatieU (an act on the organization of the judiciary) 
maintains that public prosecutors should follow the instructions of the minister 
of justice (article 5 in the old Act, 127 in the new). 
But these articles were not taken seriously. Scholars quoting them were 
considered to be textual dogmatists. Doctrine showed the way and doctrine 
was affected by the spirit of progressive ideology. Power tends to corrupt and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely. Therefore, the minister of justice should 
not rule in an absolute way. The Crown Prosecution Office should be relatively 
autonomous. 56 
10 PARADISE REGAINED 
In Francis Fukuyama's view, the period from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s 
was marked by seriously deteriorating social conditions in most of the in-
dustrialised world. Crime and disorder began to rise, making inner-city areas 
of the wealthiest societies on earth almost uninhabitable. 57 Trust and con-
fidence in institutions went into a deep, forty-year decline. During the late 
1950s a majority of people in the United States and Europe expressed con-
fidence in their governments. But the sixties meant a period of change, and 
not for the better. Fukuyama speaks of a "Great Disruption" in social values. 
In this period certain bad things happened to our social and moral life. A 
culture of excessive individualism took hold over people with a corrosion of 
virtually all forms of authority. Fukuyama analyzes the causes of this period 
of decline. He demystifies the sixties as a period of critical thinking, as an 
56 At the end of the fifties the right dogmatic position (i.e. the Crown Prosecution Service 
is subjected to democratic control) was proclaimed by: A.A.L.F. van Dullemen, JJPositie 
en taak va.'l het Openbaar Jvf.inisterie in Nederland. Preadvies Vereniging voor de vergelij-
~ kende studie van het recht van Belgie en Nederland," in Jaarboek 1958-1959 (Zwolle: W.E.J. 
Tjeenk Willink, 1958/1959), 138-166, but ten years later the theory of a relatively independent 
Crown Prosecution Office was common ground among all penallaW"fers. Cf. G. Duister-
winkel, "Vereisen de functies van het Openbaar Ministerie nieuwe wettelijke voorzieningen? 
Preadvies NJV," in Handelingen der Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging 1968 (Zwolle: Tjeenk 
Willink, 1968),1:195-251. Cf. on the history of the Dutch discussion of the Public Prosecution 
Service: P.B. Cliteur, "De hlstorische ontwikkeling van de doctrine over de constitutionele 
positie van het Openbaar Ministerie (1827-1997)," in C.J.H. Jansen en M. van der Vrugt, 
eds., Recht en geschiedenis (Nijmegen: Ats Aequi/ 1999),63-77. 
57 Cf. Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social 
Order (London: Profile Books/ 1999), 4. 
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upsurge of idealism instead of decline. His ideas on the "inevitability of 
hierarchy," in particular, are germane to our theme. 
Fortunately, according to Fukuyama we are beyond the Great Disruption, 
and we can detect positive signs for the recovery of democracy as well. On 
24 September 1999 the Secretary-general of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
mentioned before, resigned after another conflict with his minister. This date 
is an important one. In the conflict between democracy and bureaucracy demo-
cracy prevailed. 
In the field of quangos, too, improvement has been made. The initial plan 
of the government to change the written constitution in favor of quangos has 
been called off.58 And with regard to the position of the Crown Prosecution 
Office, the period between 1994 and 1998 was marked by a stormy debate 
about the role of the public prosecutor. The minister of justice and the highest 
civil servant of the Crown Prosecution Office clashed with regard to their 
mutual responsibilities.59 In 1996, the minister of Justice introduced the prin-
ciple that one can only be responsible if one has legal power.60 So if par-
liament wants to hold a minister responsible, parliament should give the 
minister power. Every party in parliament recognised this, and in a subsequent 
conflict between the minister and the highest officials of the Crown Prosecution 
Office the minister was backed by parliament. During two debates61 on what 
came to be known as "the mutiny of the prosecutors/' the principle that the 
minister of justice must "have faith" in the highest civil servants was affirmed. 
Needless to say, again democracy triumphed over bureaucracy. The Great 
Disruption of the ideology of the sixties seemed to be over. The advocates of 
its ideals in the government service were either fired or lost influence. 
Of course, many people still disagree with this paradigm shift as many 
people will disagree with my interpretation of the recent political conflicts 
in the Netherlands. The ideology of the sixties has still many adherents. But 
it appears that with the breakthrough of a new millennium the restoration 
of democracy in the Netherlands will have a fair chance to succeed. Para-
doxically, this resurgence of democracy means going back to before the revolu-
tion of the sixties to the principles on which our parliamentary democracy 
58 J'JHerstel van het primaat van de politiek bij de aansturing van zelfstandige bestuursorganen, 
Kabinetsstandpunt over het rapport van de Algemene Rekenkamer ''Zelfstandige bestuursor-
ganen en ministeriiHe verantwoordelijkheid,lII Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Den 
Haag, 3 May 1995. 
59 Ct. for an analysis of the crisis: J.L de Reede, "Crisis in de Nederlandse Justitie. De 
ministeriEHe verantwoordelijkheid voor het openbaar ministerie," Tijdschrift voor Bes-
tuurswetenschappen & Publiekrecht, 53 (1998): 699-706; M.C.B. Burkens, uDe kwestie Docters 
van Leeuwen/' Liberaal Reveil29 (1988): 64-69i P.B. Cliteur, "Indien verantwoordelijk dan 
bevoegd?H 124-137. . 
60 In W. Sorgdrager, IiMinister van justitie volledig bevoegd over openbaar ministerie," 
StaatscDurant} 4 April 1996" 6, also in NIBI 19 April 1996, 620-621. 
61 To wit: Hand.lI 1997-1998" on Rapport-Dolman, 28 January 1998, 3647-3686; Hand. 111997-
1998, on dismissal of an attorney-general, 19 February 1998,4297-4341. 
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was been built.62 Those principles appeared to have enough resilience to 
withstand the onslaught made on them by the ideologues of the sixties. 
Ironically., given the state of affairs in the Netherlands, in order to save 
the true democratic principles of Paine, our strategy had to be "'Burkean": we 
had to return, to the times before the sixties, to the true foundations of our 
political order. Conservatism appeared to be more revolutionary than the self-
styled radicals who led the way in the sixties. 
62 A common conservative complaint. Cf. EA. Hayek, The Constitution of Uberty (1960; reprint, 
London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), 1, who writes that IIfor almost a 
century the basic principles on which this civilization was built have been falling into in-
creasing disregard and oblivion" and Judge Antonin Scalia who in a time of value-relativism 
and identity politics wants to return to Enlightenment beliefs. Cf. Richard A. Brisbin, Justice 
Antonin Scalia and the Conservative Revival (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1997). 
